Thanks, Dan, for a gracious welcome -- and everyone for expressing interest in my article. Greg asked for a thread open for feedback and commentary on the Virtual Property piece, so here it is. Fire away!
As an organizing principle, I'll say this: there are lots of very good reasons people dislike and resent the phenomenon of trades in game-related "goods." I'm just not sure they're any different from the reasons we resent and dislike other people's economic actions overall. This paper tries to explain why we sometimes (stress the SOMETIMES) value private property over communitarian or contractual restrictions on private ownership, and some ruminations as to why that insight might extend to certain kinds of online resources.
On page 5 in footnote 17, you say:
I think this is not quite right :-)
--
-billy-
Posted by: Billy | Sep 26, 2005 at 22:54
As I said in the introductory thread, I found this article both clear and stimulating. I'll really only address section V. part C., points 1 and 2, as the economic and legal positions of parts A and B are comprehensible, but beyond my knowledge to question sensibly.
"1. The argument from control is not persuasive because the need for control does not require the prohibition of property interests."
You list a number of analogous cases from various sorts of property law to suggest that the creators/operators of games do not have to worry about issues of changing virtual property or being forced to maintain virtual property in perpetuity. However, there seems to me no settled law about this, thus, while your position seems reasonable and consistent, you are asking these businesses to take a substantial risk in the event that the law doesn’t fall out as you expect. Does that seem like a reasonable course from their point of view?
“2. The argument from commodification is not persuasive because the items in question are already commodities.”
Again I would suggest that the problem here is that you are not dealing with settled law. Commodities at present are, as noted early on, a grey market area. If creator/operator entities relinquish the control they now have, don’t they again embrace additional risk? How is assuming this risk advantageous to creator/operators?
Beyond those points, I have a few questions about possible future permutations, based on the assumption that virtual property is defined as your article proposes.
Firstly, there are play styles in virtual worlds that mimic criminal activities in the real world, which are in fact betrayals of trust. Here is a notable example: http://www.static.circa1984.com/the-big-scam.html. The narrator discusses a fraud he claims to have perpetrated on some of his fellow players. In a more recent example in the same game (Eve Online), players infiltrated another player-run syndicate, and then stole or destroyed resources from that syndicate worth around $16,000 in RMT value, a point that they bragged about in their post celebrating their success. Recently many WoW players were stricken with a disease intentionally transported to a common area by other players, which resulted in loss of in-game wealth by the victims. Simple trade scams have plagued most MMOs. If we apply your principles of virtual property, which, if any of these, could enter the realm of criminal and/or civil violations, and how could players be sure that actions they regard as in-character and in-fiction will not require a real world defense?
A simpler question, is portability a right for a holder of virtual property under any condition? Does virtual property defined at the ‘code’ level have any meaning if removed from the game world or transferred to another, possibly competitive, version of the game world? Could a player insist on moving a piece of virtual property from one part of the game world to another, i.e. between characters or between servers?
Finally, if you have virtual property in a game world that has the characteristics of real property (e.g. a building or an island) do you have the right, and does the operator have the responsibility to support said right, to limit the speech or actions of other players within or through your virtual property?
Posted by: Evangolis | Sep 27, 2005 at 02:20
Joshua Fairfield>Fire away!
I'm heading over to the Ludium tomorrow, so I guess there's a greater chance we'll discuss this face to face rather than on Terra Nova. Nevertheless, here are my first impressions, having had a quick look through your paper.
Much of your argument that virtual objects should be treated as real property hinges on the "quacks like a duck" assertion. It's rivalrous (just like real property), persistent (just like real property) and interconnected (just like real property), therefore it should be treated as real property. However, these aren't the only properties that virtual objects have. They're virtual (unlike real property), they're freely reproducible (unlike real property) and they can be undestroyed (unlike real property). Turning your argument the other way round, then, real property isn't like virtual property because it doesn't share any of these features; why, then, ignore them (and all the other differences) when running the argument in your direction?
Another points is that even if it is property, that doesn't mean the players own it.
The answer to the question on page 9 as to why code is trying to mimic these properties is so that it gives enough of a sense to reality to draw in the player. It's not doing it because the designer wants it to be real; it's doing it because the designer wants to give the impression that it's real. That doesn't actually make it real, though. You might as well ask why a landscape artist is trying to mimic the properties of a tree in their painting. It certainly isn't so they can sell that rivalrous, persistent, interconnected part of their picture separate to the rest of it.
Your approach to ownership, being code-based, is certainly different. Doesn't it make ownership rather meaningless, though? You say on page 39 that if you own a virtual building, you do so regardless of the intellectual property inherent in the underlying code. You don't, though, do you? Because if that's my code, I can eliminate your object on a whim. What do you own now? What's to stop me from eliminating any objects that I see being treated as if they were real when they're virtual? Your "ownership" is worthless if I can destroy what you own, or change its properties such that it's devoid of function of value. Yet if you want to prohibit me from doing that, you can't use the argument you use beginning on page 69 to explain why ownership is speculative and there's no danger in allowing the developer to make changes to what they control.
As you describe them, these property rights aren't the same as real property rights. In the real world, if I sell you a vase then, after I've given it to you, I smash it with a hammer, you can take me to court for damaging your property. If, as a virtual world owner, I sell you a vase then, after I've given it to you, I smash it to oblivion, you can't do anything about it. If you could, then ANYTHING I do that impacts on your vase would be cause for taking me to RL court.
Also, I have to ask, why does this only apply to massively multiplayer computer games? There are plenty of board games that try to mimic reality at some level of abstraction, which involve rivalrous, persistent, interconnected components. If I own my virtual sword, why don't I own Boardwalk in Monopoly?
I've probably got the wrong end of the stick in a few places here, as I haven't had time to read your paper thoroughly. I suppose the questions I have all really boil down to one: what does ownership mean in your interpretation of it?
Richard
Posted by: Richard Bartle | Sep 27, 2005 at 09:06
It's interesting that Joshua and I disagree on policy outcomes - he leaning in favor of RMT, me against - but we agree completely on the grounds over which that discussion needs to be made. Wow, what a crappy metaphor. anyway, the point is, i think the first step to a sensible rmt policy is to recognize the goods as actual property. then we can discuss externalities and damages and so on, and eventually quantify them. i'm frustrated that the anti-rmt forces with whom i am aligned policy-wise insist on sticking to IP, EULA, and first amendment to make their case. It's a weak case, imho. The stronger case is to accept the proposition that this stuff is property no different from that in the real world, and then invoke longstanding legal and policy precedents for controlling trade when it creates nuisances.
For instance: as long as we stay in the IP world, the task of measuring the cost of the RMT nuisance, and its incidence, is made more difficult. Why? Because IP is something you don't publicize, and therefore, companies don't release their economic statistics. If they thought of the millions of goods in their databases as ordinary cows and wrenches, and not precious intellectual inventions, they'd let us all know how much they trade for. Then we could measure the costs and benefits of RMT, and where they land.
Fairfield's program pushes us toward that scenario, and that's why I like it.
Posted by: Edward Castronova | Sep 27, 2005 at 09:56
edward>i'm frustrated that the anti-rmt forces with whom i am aligned policy-wise insist on sticking to IP, EULA, and first amendment to make their case. It's a weak case, imho. The stronger case is to accept the proposition that this stuff is property no different from that in the real world, and then invoke longstanding legal and policy precedents for controlling trade when it creates nuisances.
one MAJOR problem with this kind of approach (both the one you imply and that posed by Fairchild) is that it takes cultural METAPHORS and attempts to use them as evidence of FACTS about the very phenomena such METAPHORS were created to describe. that's bad science, social, legal, economic, or otherwise.
in addition, you both seem to approach the metaphysical status of virtual property as simply a question of how best to codify trade with the aim of effecting some pre-determined policy toward RMT.
so you end up arguing as follows: "we should consider 'virtual property' to be just like real property because it really helps me make sense of RMTs, and, oh yeah, i think you guys would be more likely to let me study your data if we did so.
those are neither legitimate or compelling motivations for intellectual debate about the metaphysical status of 'virtual property', frankly. rather, they are motivations for argument among consultants, not scholars.
the point is that the ramifications of the move you and Fairchild propose extend far beyond the world of RMTs, calculating the GNP of Azeroth, and determining who gets to profit from an instance of a +5 Mighty Rod of Nostril Hair Trimming.
the move you want to make has ramifications in how philosophy, cognitive science, social psychology, anthropology, game design theory, etc. each frame issues. it may be turn out to be a live option, but i don't see how one can advocate a global paradigm shift based on local exigencies like those outlined above.
Aaron
Posted by: monkeysan | Sep 27, 2005 at 13:28
With the steady increase in EULAs, I was just asking myself: "What is the counter force to these?" Apparently the answer is property law. Very interesting read, I'm sure I misunderstood it, but I liked what I misunderstood :>
Evangolis: I thought what was meant by "they are already a commodity" was that they were already a commodity *in game*. There is no in-game grey market for houses or swords of power. That market, which reduces the sword you quested for to a certain number of platinum, is fully sanctioned by the developers. That doesn't, however, address the question about the commidifcation of the character accounts, which are not commidified in-game, and do not even have a in-game metaphor. If I show up with a +1 sword, I can say I bought it from someone. But if I show up *as* Evangolis, it gets a bit tricky. The selling of characters is where I'd see commidification devaluing the "game".
Posted by: Brask Mumei | Sep 27, 2005 at 13:28
Joshua, Please accept my apologies for referring to you as "Fairchild"!!
Posted by: monkeysan | Sep 27, 2005 at 13:59
I agree with the program of getting virtual objects treated as property. But there's something that continues to bother me, and that I think has to be resolved one way or the other in order to use the most effective argument:
Edward Castronova> this stuff is property no different from that in the real world
I'm a little confused by this. Property may be property, but aren't there different kinds of property?
A virtual sword is clearly not a real sword; it's a representation of a real sword. (For some very imaginative swords, it might not even be that.) There are definitely differences between virtual objects and real objects, and I think we risk confusion by ignoring those differences.
Wouldn't it be more effective to legally treat a virtual sword as real property because it's composed of real ones and zeroes stored in a real database? Forget that it's a sword, or a boat, or an avatar; if it's ones and zeroes on my database, then it's data that I own -- it's my property -- and therefore subject to existing law covering the ownership and use of data-as-property. Users of virtual worlds are simply renters of my ones and zeroes.
So why isn't virtual world property law simply a matter of rental law applied to data?
Of course people can bring nuisance suits. And of course judges, being human, can come to bad decisions. The legal system can be complex and confusing. But in terms of the principles involved, why is the question of real world ownership of virtual world objects legally problematic at all?
I'd say it this way: Virtual worlds and all the "stuff" in them are data, and are therefore subject to the existing laws pertaining to the ownership and rental of data, with perhaps some special rules covering rights to the duplication of and access to that data.
Is there some reason why it must not/cannot be just this simple?
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Sep 27, 2005 at 14:04
I'd better clarify:
If it's ones and zeroes on my database, then it's my data property unless I explicitly acknowledge or transfer my ownership rights to someone else.
The law shouldn't be interpreted as preventing Second Life from allowing script creators to own what they create. If it's your property, then -- within reasonable limits -- you have the right to dispose of that property as you see fit, including transferring some or all of the rights to that property to someone else.
Data-as-property should follow this rule as well.
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Sep 27, 2005 at 14:21
Brask, I came to the opposite conclusion, as I hope my statements made clear, in that I assumed that the RMT comoditization was what Joshua was talking about. Yet I can see how your interpetation might come about, and reading it brings me to another question from my viewpoint, namely, if a piece of virtual property is or is not a commodity in an in-game market, does that make any difference when addressing it as virtual property, particularly when considering RMT issues?
Posted by: Evangolis | Sep 27, 2005 at 15:10
"billions of dollars are involved in gray-market transactions in such property.8"
billions? Are we talking over the lifetime of virtual property?
Posted by: | Sep 27, 2005 at 15:11
Really? What about when it is bank data, a credit history, medical information, legal files, personal information? Just because you own the medium which the data is stored on doesn't mean you own the data.
I'm certain you wouldn't contend that a co-location facility owns the code that is running on it's systems. The same applies to many ASPs. If you provide a space to host client's records that doesn't mean you suddenly own those records.
Posted by: Thabor | Sep 27, 2005 at 15:28
Edward wrote:
i'm frustrated that the anti-rmt forces with whom i am aligned policy-wise insist on sticking to IP, EULA, and first amendment to make their case.
I think you're mixing up positions here. I, for instance, am a strong opponent of violating contracts such as EULAs, but that's got nothing more inherently to do with RMT than it does with employment contract law.
So, in my case, I may be aligned with you most of the time in effect, but that's only because most RMT currently involves breaking EULAs. Aside from that, I'm all for RMT.
I insist on sticking to my opposition and basing said opposition on EULAs, because my argument is means based, not ends based. Thus, the ability (or lack thereof) of a "stick-to-contracts" argument to convince people to be anti-RMT is completely irrelevant, as that's not the goal (my goal at least) anyway. In the cases where RMT isn't breaking any EULAs, I don't see any reason to object to it.
--matt
Posted by: Matt Mihaly | Sep 27, 2005 at 17:05
Monkeysan > i don't see how one can advocate a global paradigm shift based on local exigencies like those outlined above.
I know, what was I thinking. I HATE it when global paradigm shifts are advocated based only on local exigencies. Hate it when that happens.
Posted by: Edward Castronova | Sep 27, 2005 at 17:10
I am neither pro- nor anti- RMT (I think it is a side effect of design, as you all know by now.) And I wholly reject the pro-RMT vs. anti-RMT argument as a false dichotomy (in this discussion in particular.) Especially because the RMT -> (implies) Value -> (implies) Property argument is emboldened by this false binary distinction. It belies the entire question of “ownership.” My KidTrade design clearly demonstrated that any metaphorical “player object ownership” capabilities are always under control of the developer. Heck no one has yet addressed the example of Disney’s ToonTown. Here’s a challenge assignment: Try to ToonTown’s object model into something subject common property law.
I am most decidedly against the classification of so-called “virtual property” as real-world property. Every online company I’ve ever worked with would be as well. Think about the implications!
I presented some of my arguments last year at State of Play:
http://www.fudco.com/habitat/archives/000025.html
http://web.stream57.com/nylaw/102904_virtualproperty0004.htm [video]
No one has addressed the issues I raised last year (save Cory, who wanted to move the discussion into the IP arena, where I think it might make more sense.) I don’t know when I’m going to find the 20+ hours it will take to respond to this position again, but you can count on it.
Posted by: F. Randall Farmer | Sep 27, 2005 at 18:04
Thabor, I believe there's a difference between data about people and data for people.
In most the examples you mentioned, the types of data you described would in fact be the property of whoever owns the systems on which those data are created and stored. The fact that some bit of data is about you doesn't mean you own that data. (Odd, perhaps, but true.)
On the other hand, data that I hold for you may in fact be yours; that's the part about being able to transfer or assign ownership of ones and zeroes. If I provide a service to let you store data on my system, then I'm explictly acknowledging your ownership of that data as your property. An example of this would be an ISP that provides Web hosting services. Another example would be a disaster recovery service that holds backup information for companies.
I see most virtual worlds as holding data about people, rather than holding data for people. Unless the virtual world operators explicitly say, "we acknowledge your ownership of the ones and zeroes stored on our servers," then they're not providing a data storage service; they're providing some other kind of service (in the case of MMOGs, entertainment) that relies on their ownership of that data about users.
Where this gets a little funny is the question of data creation. People are accustomed to thinking that if they create something, they own it. Most of the time (especially in the real world) that's true, but does it really apply to virtual worlds?
When I craft a sword, I intentionally perform actions that cause certain ones and zeroes which are agreed to represent a sword to be placed on a server... but I used your program to do it (and couldn't have done it without your program); that program stored those ones and zeroes on your server; and in fact before I ever "created" anything on your system I signed a contract saying that I understand that I don't own those ones and zeroes.
So even the act of creation doesn't necessarily imply ownership of the product created. When "I" crafted that sword, what I got for my effort (and subscription fee) wasn't a sword -- it was the entertainment experience of creating a sword. My character in the virtual world may "own" that sword (subject to the absolute whim of the world's operator), but I in the real world do not. Your allowing me to use your system doesn't mean I own artifacts of that system.
Property? Yes. Mine? Not unless you say so.
I think answering either of those questions in any other way not only runs afoul of any reasonable concept of property rights, but would severely stunt the development of commercial virtual worlds. I wouldn't mind seeing a good argument to the contrary, though -- if I'm wrong, I'd rather find out now than in court!
Is there some reason I'm not seeing why using your system to create data which is then stored on your system either isn't property, or (if it is property) implicitly confers on me ownership of that data property?
Where's a lawyer when you need one? *g*
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Sep 27, 2005 at 18:30
Kudos Josh - one of the more stimulating papers I've read on virtual property in a bit... of course, that doesn't mean I agree with your conclusions :)
Apologies for the long post...
The whole basis of your anticommons argument is that contractual terms can prevent higher value use of the property in question (eg: p.29). Your fundamental assumption, which recurs throughout the paper, is that the person who is willing to pay the most for a piece of virtual "property" in the *actual* world is the person who will use it the most efficiently in the *virtual* world. Doesn't this build a certain set of assumptions about how value should be measured in virtual worlds into your theory? Why are subscription numbers not an equally useful gauge of the overall value of a world? Isn't it possible banning RMT could lead to more subscriptions in some worlds?
The assertion that the most effective division of "vertical" property rights is along the lines of individual pieces of a world is somewhat arbitrary. One could (and many have) argue that an equally efficient distribution is in terms of an entire world (or perhaps a given shard, so as not to complicate things...). The owner of the world could then allocate rights in the individual pieces if it proves efficient. If your efficiency argument is true, then worlds which allocate the property rights you descibe will flourish while those who refuse to will wither. The fact that there is a market with multiple worlds makes this possible. This is a fundamental point - the existence of one virtual world does not prevent the establishment of another. Arguably, if you don't like the rights you get in one - choose one you like. Peter Ludlow's well-publicized move from TSO to Second Life is a case in point, and if there are enough people unhappy with "Kremlinden Labs", the incentive will be there for another world to offer yet another rights regime. Contract law is ostensibly versatile enough to handle this. As for the "idiosyncratic contractual burdens" which will hamper such decisions, how are these different from any other TOS/EULA (software, rentals, concert tickets, etc...)?
Analogies from real estate are fascinating, but real property is treated remarkably differently from pretty much every other form of property currently recognized by the common law. In large part this has to do with the central role land plays in the organization of human society. I fail to see why a virtual sword has analogous importance, and that limitations on use placed by the original owner should thus be curtailed. Why is a EULA more similar to a covenant on land than to a car rental agreement? Note that aside from limitations on modes of alienation, rights in real property in the US are remarkably well protected. If we are going to use the real estate analogy, why not analogize the real estate to the world as a whole? Again, the owner can subrogate certain rights, such as allowing others to visit and engage in certain activities. An amusement park, mall or ski hill all provide interesting analogies in this respect. The use of equipment, or even competition for the equipment (eg: capture the flag) do not inevitably create property rights. Finally, a point which Richard raised, is that assigning virtual property rights to anyone other than the owner of the world either creates a burden on said owner (not to alter the code) or renders the "right" meaningless.
In the end, I think your property argument may, as I think Ted implies, prove to work against the very policy goals you argue for. Even if virtual property rights were recognized - why would they vest in the player before the owner of the world? And if they vest in the owner first, the EULA only becomes a stronger instrument in their choice of how to allocate rights in their property... thus making Bart's "data rental" analogy remarkably pertinent... As for the policy reasons to limit those rights, once we are talking private property, methinks you'll find them harder to make (at least in the US), not easier.
PS - I don't understand how any of this will affect the development of virtual environments as a medium for communication, meetings, etc. Maybe I missed your point (p.19-20), but the only way I can property rights being even remotely relevant in that context would be in the same way as "property rights" in URLs - with respect to the identifier for the environment and the right to limit usage. Aside from IP rights, how would property rights in individual objects in such spaces assist in the development of graphical communication media?
PPS - Is there any way you (or Unggi, for that matter) could make the resources you have on Asian law available to the rest of us? Your citations are extensive, and my curiosity is piqued... I'm sure I'm not the only one.
Posted by: Peter Edelmann | Sep 27, 2005 at 20:46
Old argument, old faces... and now a *real* lawyer! Eh, hooray?
I agree with Bart on this one. Take a typical MMO as an example. The player pays a fee for the client and a monthly fee for the right to access the server. Unless some kind of contract agreement transfers rights to that data, it will always remain in the hands of the owner of the medium.
At what point does the player begin to have ownership rights over anything (including avatars) located on the server? Does it depend on the wording of the contract (fees for access)?
Virtual items obviously have value, but on what grounds can the individual parts of a VW be seperated in terms of ownership? How can we seperate "Awe-Inspiring Mace" from "Dijpak the PC" from access rights?
If I stop paying my fees, can I demand to be given the data representing my character and items? If that data is deleted, can I claim damages? And what about an offline RPG? If some function of the game deletes my saved data, can I claim damages? If my D&D GM allows my character to die because he thought I was being stupid, can I claim damages?
IMHO, this whole issue is a matter of what was not said. If MMO's had begun by saying "You are paying for access to our software. We are not transferring any ownership rights to you." then the case would never have been made that MegaMace is *mine* and therefore I have rights pertaining to it. Not that it would have stopped RMT from appearing...
"Owning" something in the real world means essentially having the exclusive right to use it. What does "owning" an iteration of a virtual item, which can be reproduced indefinitely and is literally identical in all ways to all other iterations, mean? It certainly isn't exclusive. The only similarity is the right to use. I think the difference between legal right to use and "I killed Ragnaros and got it" right to use has been confused. At what point does a game's natural progression begin to create legal rights? No offense intended, but it sounds absurd to me. But I try not to take my games too seriously.
Posted by: Jim Self | Sep 28, 2005 at 19:35
Oh, just thought I'd mention that I heard something about Judge Roberts recently. I don't remember the exact details, but in reference to properties in the hurricane areas he stated that all ownership of property acknowledges some level of risk of loss. Applied to VW's, virtual ownership of items and such might not give grounds for damages if game changes were considered to be a foreseen risk. Depending on how it was interpreted, it could be that virtual ownership would bestow no more rights to the player than that the devs couldn't arbitrarily take those items away.
Posted by: Jim Self | Sep 28, 2005 at 19:44
I'm curious whether there is an existing model for virtual property law based on clubs (whether cooperative clubs or "clubs" which are service companies). A member of a club may "own" something in the context of that club (a regular table, a tee-time, a dock). However, as I understand it, there's no given right of the person to trade the "property" outside the bounds of the club (a boat club may give someone the right to trade their dock, or may require that they sell it back to the club itself).
Posted by: Timothy Dang | Sep 29, 2005 at 07:52
I'm not sure I agree that an explict transfer of ownership is required (IANAL). In the generally case of downloaded or stored material whoever had ownership previously still owns it regardless of where they have stored it. Even with an agreement, I can't transfer ownership of something that I don't have rights to to begin with (ie MP3).
I'm also unsure that I would agree "information about people" is always the property of the person mantaining the information. IE: If you are retaining incorrect credit information about me, I still have a large degree of control over that information. I would say any MMOG which reserves the rights to the character data is clear cut, the player would normally have owned the data, but they agreed to the transfer of ownership as part of the contract for playing the game.
I would still say that the contract is the only reason ownership wouldn't adhere to the player (IANAL). I can create art in Window's Paintbrush, save all manner or text or data to disk using any OS, write software or a book in NotePad, etc.. None of which explicitly transfer the ownership to me. It doesn't matter that I couldn't have done it without the OS, anymore than it matters who made a pencil, paint, or typewriter that I am using.
An MMO would seem to be different in that people wouldn't normally classify it as a tool for creating other original expressions (With the exception of something like SL). With the possible exception of things like fan art created using WoW, I don't think player's have any real property in the game. Character data isn't uniquly expressive or creative.
I wonder how long it will be before fans do full renditions of classic movies within WoW. I also wonder what issues there would be with trying to sell such a product.
Posted by: Thabor | Sep 29, 2005 at 13:40
I think I understand, Thabor -- thanks for the response, and for raising another good question.
IANAL either, but I wonder if the meaningful difference between virtual objects and works created with Paintbrush or pencils or typewriters is that all the latter can exist independently of the tools used to create them, while a virtual object has no unique existence outside the MMOG in which it is created and stored. In other words, it looks like the default for ownership of transferable property is different from the default for ownership of innate property.
Let me see if I can boil this down to a couple of principles we can beat up on:
1. If something can express its identity or value outside the system used to create and maintain it, then ownership of that thing vests by default in the creator (whoever used the creating system) unless the creating/maintaining system explicitly asserts an ownership right before anything is created.
2. Conversely, if a thing can only express its identity or value inside the system used to create and maintain it, then ownership vests by default in the creating/maintaining system unless it explicitly transfers its ownership right to some other party.
Generally, then, if a created thing is transferable then its creator owns it; if it's non-transferable then the owner of the creating system owns it.
So data that can exist as itself (such as a novel or painting or song or web site) belongs to its creator unless the creator transfers ownership to someone else. But data that can only exist as itself within a particular system (such as an avatar or virtual sword or account history) belongs to whoever owns that system unless the system owner acknowledges someone else's ownership of that data.
Bearing in mind that there may be a few exceptions (such as when the government steps in and declares a special right to personal data such as credit or medical information), are most situations covered by these principles to make them valid? Or are there so many reasonable exceptions that these two principles just don't correctly describe how people think property rights should work?
If the principles are sound, is there some reason why they should be set aside just for virtual objects?
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Sep 29, 2005 at 16:42
OK, Bart and Thabor, within the rules you have described, how do you see Machinima such as Red vs Blue?
Posted by: Evangolis | Sep 29, 2005 at 16:57
The reason companies insist that 'everything' in the game is intellectual property is that it gives them rights to remove any listing they desire from most online auction sites. Ebay for instance only allows people to request the removal of items based upon intellectual, trademark or copyright infringement. This is the way they maintain control over the trade of accounts and ingame items. Ebay requires no proof other than the rights owners assurance that it is so. In the case of WOW and Blizzard Entertainment the job of policing intellectual property rights is left to The ESA who seem to make a token effort at removing items from ebay. I dont quite understand their methodology or logic in the actual policing. Perhaps ebay place limits on the amount of requests per day. I am unsure.
Hope I haven't just stated the obvious here :) Thanks.
Posted by: Jhonus | Sep 29, 2005 at 17:58
Good point, Evangolis -- if I take a picture of a thing, do I own the picture?
I'd say the answer depends on who owns the thing I take a picture of.
I'm not sure there's a difference (in terms of principles of ownership) between machinima and fanfic. In both cases you're asserting a usage right to someone else's property.
At that point it's up to the property owner to decide what to do with you. If the system owner explicitly says you can use representations of its properties, no problem. (Although they might set some content limits.) If the system owner implicitly says it's OK to use their stuff by including features to change the "sets," manipulate objects, and record images, then there's probably no problem.
Otherwise, there's a problem: you're using something you don't own.
If the system owner has a history of protecting its assets, then there's no implicit right for anyone else to use those assets, whether in machinima or fanfic or any other medium. We may tsk-tsk the greedy bastards who won't let us play with their toys, but the bottom line is that they're not our toys.
That said, there's nothing wrong with encouraging developers to follow the lead of There and Maxis (The Sims) in including features that allow players to use in-system assets to create new external works. It's not correct to assume you have a right to use someone else's property, but if the owner says it's OK or encourages it, that's fine.
All just my opinion, of course, but it seems reasonable to me. (Well, it would, wouldn't it?)
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Sep 29, 2005 at 19:22
Although, as I think further on this, there's probably some kind of "implicit use" permission that public structures are thought to have. Can I own a picture of a public building just because the building is public?
(I just checked for photography -- apparently buildings constructed after December 1, 1990 are in fact protected by copyright law! So photographs of them are verboten without the building owner's permission, but buildings constructed before that date are fair game. Hmmm.)
So is a virtual world that admits subscribers a "public structure?" What about a free world? Is being open to the public an implicit grant of a right to own representations of aspects of that world?
This is starting to make my brain hurt *g*, but let's remember that this all goes back to the question of who owns the objects that are actually in the virtual world, rather that representations of those objects. The virtual objects themselves still seem to be covered by the principles I suggested above.
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Sep 29, 2005 at 19:42
Bart > Generally, then, if a created thing is transferable then its creator owns it; if it's non-transferable then the owner of the creating system owns it.
I think you might be confusing intellectual property (IP) with personal/chattel property. The legal terminology makes this distinction confusing - IP doesn't have most of the characteristics of the kinds of property Joshua discusses in his article, and I would argue shouldn't be called "property" at all. Greatly simplified:
"real property" = land ("real estate"),
"personal/chattel property" = physical object (and some intangible things like bank accounts... this gets confusing) but not land
"intellectual property" = copyright, trademark, patents and associated rights.
[Note: AFAIK, the term personal property is from civil law, chattel from common law but the principles are analogous].
The IP rights associated with (say) a creation in Second Life are not dependent on whether or not the creation can be exported. Even if you have the only copy of a book I wrote, I still hold the copyright in the book (unless I have assigned it, etc.). That doesn't affect your ownership of the object, but simply limits your right to make and distribute copies. I seem to remember a recent lawsuit where one person's estate owned the rights to some letters/writings, but someone else had the only copies - they were fighting for access to the letters to make a copy - I don't remember the result, but it illustrates the point. The person with the letters didn't have a right to make copies, the person with the copyright didn't own any of the physical objects and thus couldn't make copies.
The difficulty with your example is that we are (in general) not just talking about the data on the server that makes up a virtual object, but the right to send copies of that data to other users. Thus, if I make an object in SL, and have the copyright, unless Linden Labs has gotten permission to send copies to other users, no one else can see it. I would imagine the TOS/EULA purports to grant such rights to Linden Labs. Without such an ageement, LL would only have "ownership" of the data in question, and the physical medium on which the data is stored. Whether you could force them to erase it would depend on the details of the contract/situation - my guess is the default under the common law would be no.
I have recently proposed distinguishing a system layer from an instantiation layer of virtual worlds for precisely this reason. IP rights (with some exceptions, eg: rights in the system code or some forms of scripting), are generally part of the instantiation. What gives individual pieces of virtual "property", say a virtual sword, the characteristics Joshua describes is the recognition of the objects in question at the system level, in particular in the world physics (see p.43-44 of Bartle's DVW for a designer's view of this). The issue is not the right to make copies of the sword, either inside or outside of the VW, but the control over that one particular object as recognized by the world physics. Is that object property in the virtual world? Sure. Does that translate into property in the actual world? Dunno - many have argued it does, and the fact that such objects trade on Ebay is a strong indicator they may be - but then again, some people see property everywhere, especially in the US. Finally, if such an object is property, what does it tell us about who actually owns that object? See my earlier post, but the short answer, I would argue, is the owner of the virtual world unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Note: A further complication is that most IP rights are granted by statute (a law passed by Congress, for example), not the common law (judge-made law).The common law is, however, the source of much of the US [real/chattel] property regime. If, as Joshua is arguing, you want the common law to recognize virtual "property", then you need to demonstrate why it fits into one of the categories recognized by the common law. He argues that it fits into the category of property (specifically real property), and explains why. If virtual property doesn't fit into some category recognized by the common law (or some existing statute), the other obvious way for courts to recognize it is if Congress (or another legislature) passes a law defining virtual property. I'll let you assess how likely that is in the US, but until it happens, I think arguments like Joshua's could significantly change virtual world dynamics if the courts use the approach he suggests.
Posted by: Peter Edelmann | Sep 29, 2005 at 19:43
Sorry, the last line of that post should have been that Joshua argues that it would be a significant change. I don't think it would be, for the reasons outlined above. (I know - reread *before* posting...)
Posted by: Peter Edelmann | Sep 29, 2005 at 19:53
I think I'd agree to that as a starting point, although I'd be inclined to nitpick on the extact language.
Within the definition we have so far I think they would constitute a type of theft, barring the owners of the pieces having transfered ownership. The machina can be expressed outside of the system. So they would own the mechanima, and the responsiblity of having taken someone else's property.
Don't get me wrong. I think they are wonderful art, and believe it should be supported. However if the owners of the property you are using don't allow it, then you are wrong to do it.
I'm not sure that is a useful distincton given the construction Bart is using. The virtual sword, etc isn't (currently) expressible outside the system in any useful manner. So the ownership obtains to the system owner.
The exchange of the sword between avatars is a grant of use permitted by the system, not a grant of ownership. I do have an express right granted by the system to allow someone to use it (while losing my usage), so that really isn't any barrier to RMT.
Barring contractual agreement to the contrary I'd say its quite possible to have RMT without involving the transfer of property.
Be mindful that Bart and I seem to be discussing what property conceptually should be rather than what it may be legally.
Posted by: Thabor | Sep 29, 2005 at 20:50
Peter, those are exactly the terms and ideas I was groping after. Thanks for clarifying. (Of course any misuse of terms below is still my fault.)
To rephrase what I was trying to say earlier, it's that virtual objects exist as both IP and chattel property (CP) that seems to be causing some of the murkiness of their legal status. Is this not also what you suggest at one point in your DiGRA paper on "Framing Virtual Law"? (Thanks for that link, BTW -- good stuff!)
Suppose a virtual sword had no real component -- it would still exist as IP and be subject to IP law. People would (mostly) understand that the idea of the imaginary Jasper Sword of Inversion belongs to whoever made it up, and thus that it isn't something that anyone else has any right to trade to a third party.
However, because persistent virtual objects do have a real (Actual layer) component -- the ones and zeroes stored on the world's database server -- they also appear to be CP in a real-world sense. (This assumes general agreement that ones and zeroes are "real.") Virtual objects exist as such only within the world, but can be moved to other copies of the world (because you're basically just copying ones and zeroes). And it's this real-world component, this ability to copy and transfer, that makes people think they have some ownership rights to virtual objects.
Their avatar can control an object in the virtual world, and they control the avatar, therefore....
But the CP component doesn't replace or eliminate the IP component of virtual objects. If a virtual sword is both IP and CP, both legal systems apply... so which will be used to determine ownership? Developers seem to want to describe virtual objects in terms of IP rights because the copyrighted expression of their IP is relatively simple to assert. Meanwhile, players want to have these objects treated as CP because they feel that regime will better support their claim to ownership.
To put this in the context of your DiGRA paper, I would modify your proposal slightly to say that virtual objects are best considered part of the Instantiation layer because their IP component resides in the Virtual layer while their "real" component (the ones and zeroes) resides in the System layer. In fact, it might be that some thing has both an IP and a CP component that defines it as being an "instantiated" kind of thing.
On that basis, has any law been made or reviewed concerning objects that have the special status of having both IP and CP components? In other words, are there other objects in other contexts that occupy their own Instantiation layer, and to which some existing real-world law has been applied? That would give us some idea how virtual objects might effectively be treated under law.
Is a book a good example of something that has both a CP component (a physical book is a real thing whose ownership can be transferred) and an IP component (the ideas expressed by the author through the words printed in the book)? Or (as I wondered above) does a virtual sword's existence solely within a particular virtual world's System layer make it effectively unlike an expression of an idea within a book (since ideas can be effectively expressed through other means, such as speech)?
Murkier and murkier. *g*
Thabor, I'm with you through most of your comments, but then I think I trip.
When you say, "The exchange of the sword between avatars is a grant of use permitted by the system, not a grant of ownership. I do have an express right granted by the system to allow someone to use it (while losing my usage)..." I agree. However, I would spell it out a little more completely to say that allowing internal exchange isn't a grant of external ownership -- that is, allowing avatars to transfer virtual items within the world doesn't confer an ownership right (i.e., a transfer right) on the players outside the virtual world who control those avatars.
Which is why when you continue, "... so that really isn't any barrier to RMT." I go, "Huh?"
I think I'm failing to understand your point of view because I'm not seeing how you're reaching this conclusion from the preceeding points. Am I erecting barriers between the real and the virtual that you don't consider meaningful or significant?
Thabor> Barring contractual agreement to the contrary I'd say its quite possible to have RMT without involving the transfer of property.
If the ones and zeroes are property, then how is their in-world transfer not a transfer of property, regardless of whether it's done internally through a secure trade or externally through RMT (followed by an in-world trade)?
As far as I can see, in the virtual world the avatar may be granted "rights" by the world owner that the player is not granted. That conclusion depends on making a legal distinction between a player and an avatar... but does anyone really want to consider the ramifications of legally equating avatars with their players?
We'd all be on Death Row as mass murderers, to start with....
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Sep 30, 2005 at 15:48
Yes, I agree with that.
I'll see if I can try to link them together a little more meaningfully then..
In essence I'm equating RMT to a service, rather than a sale of property. The system layer has already granted me the express right to perform the service, by the fact that I'm allowed to give the item to a different avatar. The ones and zero's haven't changed ownership. They still belong to the system owner. The artistic expression hasn't changed ownership.
I don't think I agree with you on this. The avatar may not be equal to me, but it is certainly a proxy for me. I'm don't see how the avatar could be granted a right which I wouldn't then be able to exercise through it.
Posted by: Thabor | Sep 30, 2005 at 18:16
Thabor wrote:
The avatar may not be equal to me, but it is certainly a proxy for me. I'm don't see how the avatar could be granted a right which I wouldn't then be able to exercise through it.
I think part of the problem is the idea that avatars can have rights. They can't have rights any more than my copy of MS Office has any rights, surely. Data doesn't get rights in any moral or legal system that I'm aware of, though I'm happy to be educated.
--matt
Posted by: Matt Mihaly | Sep 30, 2005 at 22:36
Thabor>In essence I'm equating RMT to a service, rather than a sale of property.
This would seem to me to be the best way to describe object "sales". Player A is not selling sword X to player B: player A is paying player B to transfer sword X from the inventory of player B's character to that of player A's character. This service-oriented view doesn't challenge the legal ownership of sword X at all (although EULAs could still prohibit it).
This argument doesn't wwork for the sale of characters, though.
Richard
Posted by: Richard Bartle | Sep 30, 2005 at 23:52
> Matt - I think part of the problem is the idea that avatars can have rights. They can't have rights any more than my copy of MS Office has any rights, surely. Data doesn't get rights in any moral or legal system that I'm aware of...
Just some food for thought:
(1) Corporations have a whole range of legal rights/responsibilities not attributable to their owners, as do some analogous legal constructions. In theory, I suppose an avatar-class could be created through legislation that would have legal personhood and an associated set of rights. Whether or not it would be useful is another question entirely...
(2) In the virtual world, avatars *are* granted certain rights/privileges/abilities. For example, at certain levels an avatar in a gaming world earns/obtains the right/privilege/ability to access certain areas, use certain objects, spells, etc. Rights/privileges/abilities are also granted along other lines (race, class, group affiliation, etc...). These are generally not attributable to the player who controls the avatar - when I use my alt, I don't get the same bundle of rights/privileges/abilities as with my main, but when someone else plays on my account using my main, they do. Note, I say rights/privileges/abilities because it is arguable whether these are rights, and there is clearly some danger in the overuse of rights discourse - perhaps what we are talking about is better described as abilities granted by the system code/architecture, not necessarily analogous to legal rights. At any rate, to take Richard's example of the sale of an avatar - Isn't what is being sold usually the bundle of rights/privileges/abilities associated with the avatar in the virtual world? Setting aside the possibly illicit nature of avatar sales, might the analogy to the sale of a corporation not be interesting in this respect?
Posted by: Peter Edelmann | Oct 01, 2005 at 18:23
What can and cannot be granted copyright, from http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl108.html
The idea for a game is not protected by copyright. The same is true of the name or title given to the game and of the method or methods for playing it.
Copyright protects only the particular manner of an author’s expression in literary, artistic, or musical form. Copyright protection does not extend to any idea, system, method, device, or trademark material involved in the development, merchandising, or playing of a game. Once a game has been made public, nothing in the copyright law prevents others from developing another game based on similar principles.
Some material prepared in connection with a game may be subject to copyright if it contains a sufficient amount of literary or pictorial expression. For example, the text matter describing the rules of the game, or the pictorial matter appearing on the gameboard or container, may be registrable.
According to this, the game service provider would have copyright over only the world characters that they had created themselves. It would not extend to player characters. Using the idea of ownership vs copyright from above, it would be logical to say that, for example, Blizzard/Vivendi owns my WoW character, and there is no copyright to it (yet being the author I have a kind of precedence). I would have the right to distribute copies of my character, but I don't own the only existing (and only possible) copy. I can't give or sell my character to anyone; Blizzard has the right to determine access to that copy.
For virtual objects a copyright could be gotten. Virtual objects would count as a literary/artistic expression in the game. However, since the game enables object trade and the staff allows it they are transferring their right to distribute. RMT would be, as Richard said, a service provided and not a copyright violation. If game companies declared that objects could be transferred as long as there was no RMT involved, though, then RMT would be a violation of copyright.
Posted by: Jim Self | Oct 01, 2005 at 19:21
> Bart - [...] virtual objects are best considered part of the Instantiation layer because their IP component resides in the Virtual layer while their "real" component (the ones and zeroes) resides in the System layer.
When I said "IP rights [...] are generally part of the instantiation." I was perhaps less than clear - I meant this in the sense that mostly when we talk IP, we are talking about copyright in the images/descriptions, not in the underlying code. Marvel v. NCSoft is good example - Marvel only cares about the code insofar as it allows people to make images that look/behave like Marvel's characters. There is no claim to rights in NCSoft's code per se.
Not to go too far OT, but the instantiation/virtual distinction I made in the paper is akin to the signifier/signfied in semiotics. The word "tree" vs. the idea of a tree. For example:
System: A programmed object (#24601) at location x=546; y=745 features a,b,c, etc...
Instantiation: Image/description of a tree in a meadow [Tolkien's words describing Middle Earth]
Virtual: The tree in the elven meadow as the hobbit sitting under it experiences it [Middle Earth as Frodo lives it]
Copyright may subsist in the image of the tree, but what is sold in an RMT transaction is the ability to control object #24601.
> Jim - Using the idea of ownership vs copyright from above, it would be logical to say that, for example, Blizzard/Vivendi owns my WoW character, and there is no copyright to it (yet being the author I have a kind of precedence). I would have the right to distribute copies of my character [...]
If you mean any graphics associated with your Tauren warrior, then I think Blizzard probably has a pretty strong claim to the copyright. This probably goes for the whole Tauren warrior construction (outfits, weapons, abilities, animations, etc.) to the extent they are copyrightable. If you mean some kind of character concept you've invented and constructed as you play (might be more likely on an RP server), then it gets more murky - but you might want to see a lawyer before you try to sell it to Hollywood ;) Note, the case may be somewhat different in City of Heroes which allows much greater customization (which is why NCSoft uses the EULA to try to take any IP rights you may have in your creation...).
I think there are 2 separate issues here though - as Ted said earlier, we don't need to talk about IP rights to discuss RMT. Imagine a world constructed with only public domain material (eg: Arden, using only Shakespeare). You could still have a EULA which banned RMT, players could still violate the EULA and trade items on ebay, and I don't see how the player would be in a very different position when you got to court after the owner had kicked you out and deleted your stuff - the real issue would be the enforceability of the contract.
Posted by: Peter Edelmann | Oct 01, 2005 at 23:41
Peter Edelmann wrote:
(1) Corporations have a whole range of legal rights/responsibilities not attributable to their owners, as do some analogous legal constructions. In theory, I suppose an avatar-class could be created through legislation that would have legal personhood and an associated set of rights. Whether or not it would be useful is another question entirely...
Well, indeed, corporate personhood has been granted (controversially to some), but aren't the reasons for doing so rooted in the idea that a group of stakeholders in a venture cannot act effectively as a group without being treated as an entity, in much the same way that it's far more convenient to treat a nation as an entity? There is a distinct (arguable to some socialist-types) advantage to a capitalist society in allowing collective action and recognizing that collective action takes place under the rubicon of a single "group mind" rather than merely as coincidental actions taking place simultaneously by the various involved individuals.
I mean, I guess there's no reason the law couldn't grant an avatar person-hood, but what reason would exist to do so?
(2) In the virtual world, avatars *are* granted certain rights/privileges/abilities. For example, at certain levels an avatar in a gaming world earns/obtains the right/privilege/ability to access certain areas, use certain objects, spells, etc. Rights/privileges/abilities are also granted along other lines (race, class, group affiliation, etc...). These are generally not attributable to the player who controls the avatar - when I use my alt, I don't get the same bundle of rights/privileges/abilities as with my main, but when someone else plays on my account using my main, they do. Note, I say rights/privileges/abilities because it is arguable whether these are rights, and there is clearly some danger in the overuse of rights discourse - perhaps what we are talking about is better described as abilities granted by the system code/architecture, not necessarily analogous to legal rights. At any rate, to take Richard's example of the sale of an avatar - Isn't what is being sold usually the bundle of rights/privileges/abilities associated with the avatar in the virtual world? Setting aside the possibly illicit nature of avatar sales, might the analogy to the sale of a corporation not be interesting in this respect?
I think you're right that what we're talking about in the case of avatars is a set of abilities, not a set of rights. In effect, the avatar is the key that unlocks those abilities. It's a lot like me giving you the keys to a car. Suddenly, you can go a lot faster than you could before, but it doesn't, it seems to me, have anything to do with rights.
--matt
Posted by: Matt Mihaly | Oct 02, 2005 at 14:55
Matt Mihaly> aren't the reasons for [granting corporate personhood] rooted in the idea that a group of stakeholders in a venture cannot act effectively as a group without being treated as an entity ...?
I'd always thought it was to allow a business enterprise to survive the death or departure of the individual persons who created that organization.
But analogizing that to avatars suggests that the value of treating avatars as entities with their own unique existences is to ensure their survival after their creator stops playing them... which implies that avatars should be tradeable! Hmm....
--Bart
Posted by: Bart Stewart | Oct 03, 2005 at 13:48
I'm not seeing the distinction. Transfering access of an item doesn't look any different than transfering access to an account to me. Would you please elaborate?
Perhaps permission would be a better choice of wording than rights. I was just trying to get at the idea that system owners explicitly grant permission to users through code. For example code which enables a user to easily change the totality of billing information associated with an account would tend to imply that transfering of accounts is expected and acceptable.
Whereas one that didn't allow a change of name associated with an account would imply a non-transferable account. In the case of MS Office you certainly have granted it some degree of permission to utilize your hardware, and perhaps access data. Although from a user perspective the contract isn't clearly expressed the way it is for a developer.
Thats an interesting idea. I tend to believe that less law is better, so I'm a bit leery of that notion. Such concepts should only be applied when it simplifies applying existing laws, rather than creating an entire special case area of law. Just my opinion though.
Posted by: Thabor | Oct 03, 2005 at 15:16
Peter Edelmann> In the virtual world, avatars *are* granted certain rights/privileges/abilities.
Ack! virtual "abilities" imply external-world "rights"? Yee-gods, man! Please defend that.
My corporate Unix login grants me access to certain files. Does that mean my login should be granted legal-entity-status (incorporated) so my estate can get those files when I die/leave the company/sell them on ebay?
Would someone please demonstrate why 'avatars' have inherent or "god-given" special (out-of-context) status over any other remotely hosted data construct?
I'm clearly in metaphor hell.
Posted by: F. Randall Farmer | Oct 03, 2005 at 17:55
Bart Stewart wrote:
I'd always thought it was to allow a business enterprise to survive the death or departure of the individual persons who created that organization.
Well, that's one reason it's convenient to grant corporations personhood certainly. Liquidity and the ability to divide up ownership so that investment is possible is another. The point is that the reason it's done is that it's believed to be of benefit to society as a whole. I can see no comparable benefit to giving avatar's personhood status. I can't see any societal benefit at all, in fact.
--matt
Posted by: Matt Mihaly | Oct 03, 2005 at 19:23
>Randall Farmer - Ack! virtual "abilities" imply external-world "rights"? Yee-gods, man! Please defend that.
I said "In the virtual world, avatars are granted certain abilities/privileges/rights." That would be "in-world". Whether they translate into abilities/privileges/rights in the "external-world" is another question, one I don't remember addressing. What I did say is that avatars, along with their bundle of "in-world" abilities/privileges/rights [whatever you want to call them] do get sold on ebay, and are thus transferable as a unit. Is the purchase of a corporation in the actual ["external"] world along with its abilities/privileges/rights so different that the comparison is pointless? Maybe - I'm open to hearing why.
I gave incorporation as an example to think about when Matt said data couldn't have legal rights in an actual world legal system. Do I think a corporation is exactly like data? Not necessarily, but it definitely isn't a corporeal person and yet it has rights. I also didn't say such rights *should* be afforded to avatars, merely that it is *possible* to think in such terms in existing legal systems. Note that I very specifically pointed out the problems of overuse of rights discourse, and was presenting the example as a thought experiment. I don't necessarily disagree with your or Matt's assessment re: avatar rights, but I think it is useful to explore what we mean by such things.
> I'm clearly in metaphor hell.
So this is hell eh? I always thought there would be more lawyers...
Posted by: Peter Edelmann | Oct 03, 2005 at 21:43
Peter Edelmann>Whether [avatarabilities/privileges/rights] translate into abilities/privileges/rights in the "external-world" is another question, one I don't remember addressing.
Upon re-reading, I agree that you didn't address that issue. Sorry for the confusion.
Others made that connection in the thread before (and after) you. The "Yee-gods" should now be considered as addressing them. :-)
Me>>I'm clearly in metaphor hell.
Peter Edelmann>So this is hell eh? I always thought there would be more lawyers...
MORE lawyers? I see plenty, right here.
Posted by: F. Randall Farmer | Oct 04, 2005 at 17:08